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Practical Cryptanalysis of a Public Key Cryptosystem Based
on the Morphism of Polynomials Problem
Jaihui Chen∗ , Chik How Tan, and Xiaoyu Li
Abstract: Multivariate Public Key Cryptography (MPKC) has intensively and rapidly developed during the past
three decades. MPKC is a promising candidate for post-quantum cryptography. However, designing it is universally
regarded as a difficult task to design a secure MPKC foundation scheme, such as an encryption scheme and key
exchange scheme. In this work, we investigate the security of a new public key cryptosystem that is based on the
Morphism of Polynomials (MP). The public key cryptosystem proposed by Wang et al. (Wuhan University, China)
comprises a key exchange scheme and encryption scheme. Its security can be provably reduced to the hardness of
solving a new difficult problem, namely, the Decisional Multivariate Diffie Hellman (DMDH) problem. This problem
is a variant of the MP problem, which is difficult to solve by random systems. We present a proposition that reduces
the DMDH problem to an easy example of the MP problem. Then, we propose an efficient algorithm for the Key
Recover Attack (KRA) on the schemes of the public key cryptosystem. In practice, we are able to entirely break the
cryptosystem’s claimed parameter of 96 security levels in less than 17.252 s. Furthermore, we show that finding
parameters that yield a secure and practical scheme is impossible.
Key words: cryptanalysis; post-quantum cryptography; multivariate public key cryptosystems; morphism of
polynomials problem

1 Introduction
Since the invention of Shor’s algorithm[1] , current
cryptography algorithms based on number theory can
be broken in polynomial time by a quantum computer.
Therefore an alternative to these algorithms must be
identified. The alternative, which must be resistant to the
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attack of quantum computers, is called post-quantum
cryptography. Besides code-based cryptography, i.e.,
schemes based on non-quasi cyclic Codes[2] , Multivariate
Public Key Cryptography (MPKC) is also considered as
one of the most promising candidates for post quantum
cryptography. Its security is based on solving a set
of random Multivariate Quadratic (MQ) equations on a
finite field that has been proven to be Non-deterministic
Polynomial (NP) hard.
However, no evidence has
shown that quantum computers can solve this kind of
problem efficiently. Furthermore, MPKC schemes are
considerably more efficient than current cryptography
algorithms, such as Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman (RSA)
scheme, in computing and are friendlier to resourcerestricted environment, i.e., wireless sensor networks[3] .
Since the Matsumoto-Imai scheme introduced the
first MPKC encryption scheme[4] , a number of MPKC
schemes have been proposed. However, the construction
of these MPKC schemes relies not only on the MQ
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problem but also on the Isomorphism of Polynomials (IP)
problem. Given the uncertainty of the IP problem, most
MPKC schemes have been broken, i.e., the MatsumotoImai scheme and, balanced Oil and Vinegar (OV)
scheme[5] . Rare exceptions, such as the simple matrix
encryption (ABC)[6] and double hidden field encryption
(ZHFE)[7] , are considered as probable MPKC encryption
schemes. Nonetheless, these schemes exhibit different
disadvantages. For example, ABC may experience
decryption failure, and ZHFE has limited key generation
space[8] . Thus, existing promising MPKC schemes are all
signature schemes, such as Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar
(UOV) scheme[9] , Rainbow[10] , Quartz[11] , Gui[12] , MQbased Digital Signature Scheme (MQDSS)[13] , and HSSign[14] .
In addition, a number of attempts have been undertaken
to tackle the provable security problem of MPKC. For
example, Courtois[15] studied provable security against the
key-only attack on Quartz, but failed to clarify security
against the chosen-message attack. Bulygin et al.[16]
presented a concept for reducing the public key size
of the UOV signature scheme and provided a provable
security against direct attacks.
Then, Sakumoto et
al.[17] provided a provable security proof of UOV against
the chosen-message attack by using the idea given by
Bellare and Rogaway[18] wherein a random seed r is
concatenated with the signed message M to render the
basic trapdoor one-way function into full domain hash.
In Crypto2011, Sakumoto et al.[19] proposed provably
secure identification/signature schemes based on the MQ
problem. These schemes have greatly improved the
security of MPKCs. However, whether their techniques
can be translated into a secure encryption scheme remains
unknown.
Recently, together with their work on cryptanalysis
of cryptosystems based on non-abelian factorization
problems[20] , Wang et al.[21] (WZM) proposed a novel
public key cryptosystem that is based on the Morphism of
Polynomials (MP) problem. In contrast to other schemes,
their schemes can be provably reduced to the hardness of
solving a new difficult problem, namely the Decisional
Multivariate Diffie Hellman (DMDH) problem. This
problem is a variant of the MP problem, which is known to
be NP-hard for random systems.
Our work mainly focuses on the WZM cryptosystem.
We provide two major contributions according to the
WZM cryptosystem. On the theoretical side, we explore
the minimal polynomial property of a matrix and present
a proposition that reduces the DMDH problem to an

easy instance of the MP problem. In addition, we supply
an efficient algorithm to break the WZM schemes. On
the practical side, we implement a plenty of attack
experiments to attack the WZM scheme. We are able to
completely break their claimed parameter at 96 security
levels in less than 17.252 s. Accordingly, we conclude that
finding parameters that yield a secure and practical scheme
is impossible.
This paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we
describe the hard problems underlying MQ schemes and
Key Recovery Attacks (KRAs). Then, we overview WZM
schemes in Section 3. In Section 4, we illustrate that
WZM schemes with their recommended parameter of 96
security levels are entirely broken within a few seconds.
Concluding remarks is provided in Section 5.

2

Preliminaries

The basic objective of multivariate cryptography is to
utilize a system of multivariate quadratic polynomials
over a finite field Fq . Thus, the security of multivariate
cryptosystems is based on the MQ problem which is
defined as follows.
Definition 1 Given m quadratic polynomials p1 , ...,
pm in n variables over a finite field Fq , find a vector
x = (x1 , ..., xn ) ∈ Fnq such that p1 (x) = · · · = pm (x) = 0.
This problem is NP hard even for quadratic systems
over the field of two elements[22] .
However, for most existing MPKCs, the coefficients
of the public system P (a collection of m quadratic
polynomials p1 , ..., pm in n variables) are not chosen
randomly. Instead, one begins with an easily invertible
quadratic map F (called central map) and combines it with
two invertible affine maps S and T to obtain a public key
of the form P = S ◦ F ◦ T . Therefore, the security of the
scheme is based not only on the MQ problem, but also on
the IP problem, which is defined as follows.
Definition 2 The IP problem is the problem of finding
an isomorphism (S, T ) from P to F , where P and F are
the two public sets of u quadratic equations, and S and T
are isomorphic.
The scarcity of existing knowledge on the hardness of
the IP problem mainly prevents researchers from providing
security proofs for their MPKCs.
However, when the above affine transformations S and
T are not bijective, the problem is called MP problem that
has been proven to be NP hard for any finite field[23] .

3

New Public Key Cryptosystem Based on
the MP Problem

In this section we review the new WZM public key
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cryptosystem[21] and the novel hard problem underlying
WZM schemes. WZM proposed two schemes in their
public key cryptosystem: a key exchange scheme and a
public key encryption scheme. In addition, given that
their public key encryption scheme uses the same trapdoor
and is based on the same problem as their key exchange
scheme, we only describe the key exchange scheme in
this paper. Below, we provide an overview of their key
exchange scheme.
Let MQ(n, m, Fq ) be a family of multivariate quadratic
functions as follows:
F (x) = (f1 (x), ..., fm (x)),
∑n
∑n
fi (x) =
αi,j,k xj xk +
βi,j xj + γi ,
j6k

j

where αi,j,k , βi,j , and γi ∈ Fq for i = 1, ..., m.
Let T be an m × m matrix, define f (T ) = αm T m +
αm−1 T m−1 + · · · + α1 T 1 + α0 I and KT = {f (T )|∀T ∈
Mm (Fq )}, where Mm (Fq ) is a set of m×m matrices over
Fq , αi ∈ Fq , 0 6 i 6 m.
Similarly, let U be an n × n matrix, define f (U ) =
βn U n+βn−1 U n−1+· · ·+β1 U 1+β0 I and KU = {f (U )|∀U ∈
Mn (Fq )}, βi ∈ Fq , 0 6 i 6 n, where Mn (Fq ) is a set of
n × n matrices over Fq , βi ∈ Fq , 0 6 i 6 n.
The two elements Ta and Tb in KT satisfy the
multiplication commutative law, that is, Ta Tb = Tb Ta . In
addition, the two elements Ua and Ub in KU satisfy the
multiplication commutative law, that is Ua Ub = Ub Ua .
In reference to the above situation, we describe the key
exchange scheme proposed by Wang et al.[21] as follows:
(1) Let Alice and Bob be two parties that agree on
publicly available system parameters (Fq , F, T, U ), where
F ∈ MQ(n, m, Fq ), and two singular matrix T ∈R Mm
and U ∈R Mn , of which the degrees of minimal
polynomials are attained in m and n.
(2) Upon obtaining the system parameters (Fq , F,
T, U ), Alice chooses Ta ∈ KT and Ua ∈ KU at random
and computes Ga = Ta ◦ F ◦ Ua . Then Alice sends Ga to
Bob.
(3) Bob receives Ga and obtains the system parameters
(Fq , F, T, U ). He chooses Tb ∈ KT and Ub ∈ KU at random
and computes Gb = Tb ◦F ◦Ub . Bob sends Gb to Alice and
computes the shared key kB = Gab = Tb ◦ Ga ◦ Ub .
(4) Alice receives Gb and computes the shared key
kA = Gba = Ta ◦ Gb ◦ Ua .
Given that Ta and Tb in KT , Ua and Ub in KU
satisfy the multiplication commutative law, and Alice and
Bob successfully establish a common session key sk =
kA = kB , which is a multivariate quadratic function in
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MQ(n, m, Fq ).
Now, we will revisit the fact that the hardness of this
new problem is related to the difficulty of solving a DMDH
problem which is defined below.
Definition 3 Computational
Multivariate
Diffie
Hellman (CMDH) problem. Given a triple (F, Gx , Gy ),
the CMDH problem involves finding the MQ function Gxy
such that Gxy = Tx ◦Ty ◦F ◦Ux ◦Uy , where Gx = Tx ◦F ◦Ux ,
Gy = Ty ◦ F ◦ Uy , Gxy = Tx ◦ Ty ◦ F ◦ Ux ◦ Uy and
F ∈ MQ(n, m, Fq ), Tx , Ty ∈ KT , Ux , Uy ∈ KU .
Definition 4 DMDH problem. Given a 4-tuple (F,
Gx , Gy , Gz ), the DMDH problem involves deciding
whether Gz = Gxy , where Gx = Tx◦F◦Ux , Gy = Ty◦F◦Uy ,
Gxy = Tx ◦ Ty ◦ F ◦ Ux ◦ Uy , and F ∈ MQ(n, m, Fq ),
Tx , Ty ∈ KT , Ux , Uy ∈ KU .
The relationship among these problems, including the
MP problem, is similar to the relationship in the case of
the computing Diffie Hellman problem, the decision Diffie
Hellman problem, and the discrete-logarithm problem.
That is, we do not know whether CMDH and DMDH
belong to an NP-hard problem. A straightforward method
to solve this problem is to identify the two non-bijective
affine transformations Tx and Ux when given Gz and Gxy .
Thus, the basic hypothesis for parameter setting is to
assume that solving the above problem is essentially not
easier than solving the MP problem with random nonbijective affine transformations.
Assumption Hardness Hypothesis by Wang et al.[21]
Solving the above DMDH problem is as hard as solving
the MP problem.
However, this assumption is wrong. In the next section,
we will show that this DMDH problem is an easy instance
of the MP problem.

4

Cryptanalysis of the New Public Key
Cryptosystem Based on the MP Problem

Now, we analyze the security of WZM schemes against
KRA.
4.1

Revisitation of the first attack

The goal of breaking WZM schemes is to evaluate their
basic problems: the MP problem and the proposed DMDH
problem.
As stated by Ref. [21], the first KRA attempts to
directly find the private key pair (Ta , Ua ) from Ga or
m
∑
(Tb , Ub ) from Gb . Let Ta =
αi T i + α0 I and Ua =
n
∑
i=1

i=1

βi U + β0 I. For any x ∈ F , we have
i

n
q
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Ga (x) − Ta ◦ F ◦ Ua (x) ≡ 0.
Now we consider the first attack discussed by Wang et
al. The problem of finding (Ta , Ua ) from Ga or (Tb , Ub )
from Gb is viewed as a random instance of the reduced MP
problem, and the number of unknown variables is reduced
m
∑
from m2 + n2 to m + n. Given that Ta =
αi T i + α0 I
[21]

and Ua =

n
∑

i=1
i

βi U + β0 I, we can obtain the following

i=1

n

q cubic equations with respect to α1 , .., αm , β1 , ..., βn by
substituting all x into the equation Ga (x)−Ta ◦F ◦Ua (x) ≡
0.
∑ (1)
∑ (2)
∑ (3)
ξijkt αj βk βt +
ξijk αj βk +
ξijk βj βk +
j,k,t
j,k
j,k
∑ (4)
∑ (5)
(1)
ξij αj +
ξij αj +ξi(6) = 0
j

j

where 1 6 i 6 q and all coefficients are in Fq .
WZM suggested that in general, α0 and β0 are equal to
0 to ensure that Ta and Tb are singular, and the total number
of combined unknowns in the above Eq. (1) is N = mn2 +
mn+n(n+1)/2+m+n.[21] If we can select more than this
number of linearly independent equations from Eq. (1),
then solving the above system through linearization is easy.
However, WZM claimed that because F and (Ta , Tb )
are selected at random, the construction of such linearly
independent equations search process and the complexity
is approximately O(q n ).
However, the above attack can be constructed through
another approach. Given that Ga (x)−Ta ◦F ◦Ua (x) ≡ 0 for
all x ∈ Fnq , the coefficients of Ga (x) and the coefficients
of Ta ◦ F ◦ Ua (x) are equal. (F, T, U ) are publicly known
system parameters. Thus, if we use symmetric matrices
to represent the quadratic component of the public key F
(omitting the linear part of F will not affect cryptanalysis),
mn(n + 1)
we can obtain the following
cubic equations
2
with m + n variables.
∑ (3)
∑ (2)
∑ (1)
λijk βj βk +
λijk αj βk +
λijkt αj βk βt +
n

j,k,t

∑

j,k

j,k

(4)
ij

λ αj +

j

∑

(5)
ij

λ αj +λ

(6)
i

=0

(2)

j

mn(n + 1)
and all variables are in Fq .
2
4.2 KRA with direct attacks
where 1 6 i 6

mn(n + 1)
cubic equations
2
with m + n variables requires the use of the direct
attacks technique. The direct attacks use equation solvers,
including extended linearization (XL)[24] and Gröbner
Basis algorithms, such as F4 [25] and F5 [26] . We briefly
Solving such a system of

describe these equation solvers below.
Bettale et al.[27] asserted that for a semiregular system,
the((
computational
complexity
of F4 is bounded by
(
))ω )
n + dreg − 1
O
t
, where n is the number of
dreg
variables, t is the number of equations, and ω is a linear
algebraic constant and 2 6 ω 6 3. In general, we set ω = 2
for lower bound complexity and ω = 3 for upper bound
complexity. dreg is the degree of regularity of the system,
which is the index of the first non-positive coefficient in
the Hilbert series Sm,n with
∏m
(1 − z di )
,
Sm,n = i=1
n
(1 − z)
where di is the degree of the i-th equation and z is the
variable of the Hilbert series.
The HybridF5 (HF5 ) algorithm[27] is currently the
fastest algorithm among all the direct attacks algorithms.
Its underlying principle is the deduction of some variables
required to create overdetermined systems before the
F5 algorithm is applied. Thus, one has to run the
F5 algorithm several times (depending on how many
variables he/she guesses) to find a solution for the
original system. When guessing u variables over Fq ,
this number is given by q u . The complexity of solving
a semiregular system of t multivariate equations in n
variables over Fq by the HF5 algorithm can be estimated
(( (
))ω )
n − u + dreg − 1
u
as q O
t
.
dreg
Generally speaking, the best direct attack algorithm for
solving multivariate polynomial equations over medium
fields is the HF5 algorithm, and that for solving
multivariate polynomial equations over large fields is the
F4 (or F5 ) Gröbner Basis algorithms.
When the underground field is small and under the
mn(n + 1)
= ε(m + n)2 , ε > 0, as
assumption that
2
is discussed in Ref. [24], the best algorithm is the
XL algorithm, and the complexity is O((m + n)ωD /D!),
√
where D ≈ ⌈1/ ε⌉.
However, the above result cannot be used directly
in the WZM scheme because it is based on the DMDH
problem which seems as hard as the MP problem. Next we
discuss why direct attack algorithms cannot be efficiently
used to solve the MP problem.
Recall that for a system based on the MP problem, we
assume that Ga and F are two public sets of m quadratic
equations, and Ta and Ua are two non-bijective morphism
transformations, where Ga (x) − Ta ◦ F ◦ Ua (x) ≡ 0 for all
x ∈ Fnq . The target of solving MP problem is to recover Ta
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mn(n + 1)
2
cubic equations with m2 +n2 variables, but because Ta and
mn(n + 1)
cubic equations
Ua are singular, the resultant
2
are not independent and can be reduced to a small number
of cubic equations.
The number of reduced equations depends
on the rank of Ta and Ua , and the final
number of reduced cubic equations is attained by
Rank(Ua )·Rank(Ta )·(Rank(Ta )+1)
. Taking parameters
2
q = 216 , n = 12, and m = 10 as an example, if we treat
all polynomials of F as homogeneous in general, we will
obtain a system of 780 cubic equations with 244 variables.
However, assuming that the rank of Ta is 9 and that of
Ua is 11, the resultant cubic equations can be reduced to
594 cubic equations with 244 variables. When the rank
of Ta and Ua is small, the resultant cubic equations can
be reduced to a small number of equations. Given that
we do not know the number of independent equations,
direct attack algorithms cannot be efficiently used to solve
this MP problem. The same situation requires the use
of direct attack algorithms to attack WZM schemes that
mn(n + 1)
provide a system of
cubic equations with m+n
2
variables for reducing cubic equations. Similarly, taking
the parameters q = 216 , n = 12, and m = 10 recommended
by Wang et al.[21] as an example, we will obtain a system of
780 cubic equations with 22 variables. However, assuming
that the rank of Ta is 8 and that of Ua is 10, the resultant
cubic equations can be reduced to 360 cubic equations
with 22 variables. These equations will be difficult to solve
with direct attack algorithms. Thus, the equation seems to
be solvable only by an exhaustive search algorithm, as
claimed by Wang et al.[21] , who stated that their schemes
are based on the reduced MP problem wherein the number
of variables are reduced from m2+n2 to m+n. In addition,
this problem remains intractable because it can only be
dealt with by an exhaustive search attack.
Through the above discussion, we find that the use
of a direct attack to solve the MP problem is mainly
hindered by the following: The resultant cubic equations
are not independent and reducible. Thus, if we can find
some method to convert the resultant cubic equations into
nonreduced equations, we can use direct attack algorithms
to solve this problem. Luckily, we find a property of the
minimum polynomial to break the intractability of DMDH
problem. Below, we present a proposition to illustrate that
the DMDH problem can be reduced to an easy instance of
and Ua . Similarly, we can obtain a system of
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the MP problem.
Proposition The DMDH problem of WZM schemes
can be reduced to an easy instance of the MP
problem. This reduction shows that recovering the two
transformations is always equal to solving a system of
mn(n + 1)
independent cubic equations with m + n
2
variables.
Let fmin T (x) and fmin U (x) be the corresponding
minimum polynomials of matrices T and U , respectively.
In the construction of WZM schemes, the degree of the
minimum polynomial of matrices T and U is equal to m
∑m−1
and n, respectively. Let fmin T (x) = xm + i=0 αi′ xi and
∑
n−1
fmin U (x) = xn + i=0 βi′ xi , we have
Tm =−
and

Un = −

∑m−1
i=0

∑n−1
i=0

αi′ T i

βi′ T i .

Recall that Ta = αm T m + αm−1 T m−1 + · · · + α1 T and
Ua = βn U n +βn−1 U n−1 +· · ·+β1 U in the construction of
WZM schemes, we have
∑m−1
Ta = αm (− i=0 αi′ T i ) + αm−1 T m−1 + · · · + α1 T 1 =
∑m−1
(αi − αm αi′ )T i − αm α0′ T 0
i=1
and
∑n−1
Ua = βn (− i=0 βi′ U i ) + βn−1 U n−1 + · · · + β1 U 1 =
∑n−1
(βi − βn βi′ )U i − βn β0′ U 0 .
i=1
If we let γ0 = −αm α0′ , γi = αi − αm αi′ and η0 =
−βn β0′ , ηj = βj − βn βj′ , where 1 6 i 6 (m − 1), 1 6 j 6
(n − 1), and all elements are in Fq .
Finally we will get
∑m−1
Ta =
γi T i
i=0

and

Ub =

∑n−1
i=0

ηi U i .

The above equations show that because of the restraint
of the degree of minimum polynomial of matrices T and
U must be equal to m and n, respectively, and Ta and
Ua are always bound by the coefficients of the minimum
polynomial of matrices T and U , respectively. Ta and Ua
are not randomly generated and are always equal to new
T ′ a and U ′ b as shown by the following form.
T ′a =
and
U ′b =

∑m−1
i=0

∑n−1
i=0

γi′ T i

ηi′ U i .

Recall that solving the DMDH problem involves
finding the two nonbijective affine transformations Ta and
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Ua , when given F and Ga .
In addition, because T and U are known, knowing
fmin T (x) and fmin U (x) is easy. Consequently, if we can
solve the above γi′ , 0 6 i 6 (m−1) and ηj′ , 0 6 j 6 (n−1),
we can recover the underlying Ta and Ua . Then, we have
Ga (x) − Ta′ ◦ F ◦ U ′ a (x) ≡ 0 for all x ∈ Fnq . Thus we can
mn(n + 1)
obtain a system of
cubic equations with m+n
2
variables γi′ , 0 6 i 6 (m − 1) and ηj′ , 0 6 j 6 (n − 1).
However, because
∑m−1
Ta′ =
γi′ T i
i=0

and

U ′b =

∑n−1
i=0

ηi′ U i ,

the resultant equations are always independent equations.
Finally, the DMDH problem of WZM schemes is
reduced to an easy instance of the MP problem. Its solution
mn(n + 1)
is equal to solving a system of
independent
2
cubic equations with m + n variables.
4.3 Our attack algorithm
Now we will describe our modified attack algorithm,
which uses direct attacks.
The above discussion shows that we can use other
algorithms rather than the exhaustive search algorithm for
KRA on WZM schemes. Our modified attack algorithm
on KRA for WZM schemes over a finite field is described
in Algorithm 1.
In our attack algorithm, despite Ta = αm T m +
αm−1 T m−1 + · · · + α1 T and Ua = βn U n + βn−1 U n−1 +
· · · + β1 U , where αi , 1 6 i 6 m and βi , 1 6 i 6 n are
the constructed unknowns, we do not directly recover these
unknowns but instead construct other unknowns γi′ , 0 6 i 6
(m − 1) and ηj′ , 0 6 j 6 (n − 1) which can ensure direct
attack algorithms run efficiently. According to our above
analysis in Proposition, by using γi′ , 0 6 i 6 (m − 1) and
ηj′ , 0 6 j 6 (n − 1), we can also recover Ta and Ua .
4.4 Practical attack
parameters

under

the

recommended

Wang et al.[21] proposed concrete parameters for their
scheme at the commendable security level of 96. The
parameters are chosen as follows: q = 216 , n = 12, and

Algorithm 1 Our algorithm for KRA on WZM schemes
(Ga , F, T, U )
Require:
Ga : the key Alice sends to Bob;
F, T, U : the public system parameters;
Ensure:
Ta , Ua : the private key;
1: Construct two new transformation Ta′ and Ua′ in the form:
∑m−1
Ta′ =
γi′ T i
i=0

and
Ua′ =

∑n−1
i=0

ηi′ U i ;

2: Let Ga (x)−Ta′ ◦F ◦Ua′ (x) ≡ 0 for all x ∈ Fn
q and generate a system
cubic equations with m+n variables γi′ , 0 6 i 6 (m−1)
of
2
and ηj′ , 0 6 j 6 (n − 1);
3: Solve the system using the appropriate direct attack algorithms in
accordance with the finite field and obtain all solutions (defined as
sol);
4: For every sol[i] do
5: Compute
∑m−1
Ta′ =
sol[i]j T i
mn(n+1)

j=0

and
Ua′ =

∑n−1
j=0

sol[i]j+m U i ;

6: Check if Ta′ ◦ F ◦ Ua′ = Ga and mark the position as pos when it is
correct;
7: End for;
∑
∑n−1
i
i
8: return Ta = m−1
j=0 sol[pos]j T , Ua =
j=0 sol[pos]j+m U ;

m = 10. In this section, we show that security is essentially
incompatible for WZM schemes.
The result of our cryptoanalysis to the lower/upper
bound complexities against KRA with direct attack by F4
which are 222 /230 for WZM (F216 , 10, 12) not 296 claimed
security in Ref. [21]. Table 1 shows the improvements
of lower bound (ω = 2) and upper bound (ω = 2.8) in
the complexity of solving such a system by using different
attack methods for WZM (F216 , 10, 12).
Table 1 shows that the rank of T and U is assumed
to be 9 and 11, respectively. Table 1 also shows that the
number of reduced equations in KRA with direct attack is
smaller than that with our modified attack. Thus, even in
the simplest non-bijective form (the rank of T and U is n−1
and m−1, respectively), the complexity remains as high as
252 and memory will be insufficient when performing such
an attack in practice. However, when using our modified
attack algorithm, all equations are independent equations,
and the attack complexity is only 222 .
Furthermore, we are able to attack WZM schemes. We

Table 1 Lower and upper bounds of the complexity of different KRA algorithms against WZM schemes with (Fq , n, m) =
(F216 , 12, 10).
Attack algorithm
KRA with exhaustive search

Number of equations (reduced)
2192

(linear)

Number of variables
1660

KRA with direct attacks (directly)

594 (cubic)

22

KRA with our attacks

780 (cubic)

22

Complexity (lower/upper)
296 /2192
254 /262

(Out of Memory)
222 /230
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completely break WZM schemes under their
recommended parameters (F216 , 12, 10). We program
and run our modified attack algorithm using MAGMA[28]
v2.20-5. All experiments are run on a workstation with
a Dual XEON Quad Core 2.27 GHz processor, 24 GB
of main random access memory, and operation system
of Scientific Linux 5.11 (Boron). In addition to the
recommended parameters, we also attack other parameters
(F212 , 14, 12) and (F26 , 28, 20) under reasonably selected
conditions in accordance with the security analysis
provided by Wang et al.[21] to evaluate the security of
different fields under our attack. We perform each attack
1000 times during each test. The results are listed in
Table 2. We break their recommended parameters at 96
security levels in less than 17.252 s. The results of the
practical attacks summarized in Table 2 shows that we can
efficiently break the schemes in different fields at their
claimed security within several seconds.
Finally, we attempt to estimate the secure and optimal
parameters that will enable WZM schemes to resist our
attacks. We select secure and optimal parameters for WZM
schemes at different security levels in accordance with
the theoretical complexity of our attacks. The selected
parameters are summarized in Table 3, which shows
that more than 10 million multiplication operations are
required to encrypt just one plaintext to achieve 80-bit
security. This requirement is impractical because
encrypting just one plaintext requires an estimated running
time of more than 10 min. Thus, finding parameters that
yield a practical scheme for the WZM cryptosystem is
Table 2

Results of theoretical complexities and practical

KRA using our modified attack algorithm on WZM
schemes.
Parameter

Claimed

Theoretical

Attack

(Fq , n, m)

security

complexity (lower/upper)

time (s)

(F216 , 12, 10)

296

222 /230

17.252

284

232 /243

91.87

284

232 /243

330.86

(recommend)
(F212 , 14, 12)
(select)
(F26 , 28, 20)
(select)

Table 3

Estimated parameters for WZM schemes at given

security levels.
Parameter

Security

Encryption

Decryption

(Fq , n, m)

level

(Muls)

(Muls)

(F216 , 28, 26)

280

9 956 926

8 885 240

(F212 , 32, 36)

280

31 876 164

29 147 904

(F26 , 64, 70)

280

841 995 030

801 207 680

677

impossible.

5

Conclusion

We used modified attacks to investigate the security of
the WZM schemes, a new public key cryptosystem that
is based on the MP problem, against the KRA. We
showed that our attack algorithm completely broke the
recommended parameters for WZM schemes at 96 security
levels in less than 17.252 s. We attempted to estimate
secure and optimal parameters at 80-bit security levels
to resist our attacks. However, WZM schemes with
these parameters are considerably slower than expected.
Therefore, finding parameters that yield a secure and
practical scheme is impossible.
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